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I should like to thank Fidélia and the organizers of DOCAM 2019 for inviting me 
to give this talk. It is an honor to be here in Toulon and to have this opportunity to 
start a conversation about what I am calling the ontology of documents. The title of 
the talk is “The ontology of documents, revisited” which is gesturing towards the 
fact that I am far from the first to give a talk on that topic. The philosopher Barry 
Smith has been talking about the ontology of documents since at least 2005, and 
part of my goal today is to shine the DOCAM lamp on his work. 
The talk is divided into three sections. First of all, building from Michael 
Buckland’s well-known paper “What is a document?,” I shall present a brief survey 
of definitions of “document” from the last century or so. My conclusion from this 
will be that those definitions which most accurately reflect the ways in which the 
term “document” is used in practice are typically compound definitions, consisting 
of two or three elements. This is because documents are complex objects, not 
simple ones. Each element of a definition refers to a different mode or function of 
documents: (a) document-as-carrier, or medium, (b) document-as-text, or message, 
and (c) document-as-content, or meaning.  
The second section of the talk introduces the idea of category theory, a 
branch of the philosophical subfield of ontology, whose contributors work towards 
the identification of the most fundamental categories of things that exist (or could 
possibly exist) in the world. One celebrated contributor to category theory is the 
philosopher E. J. Lowe, and I shall look at his so-called four-category ontology 
with a view to locating documents’ place in it. As we shall see, this is not as easy 
as it might initially appear to be, but my tentative conclusion is that documents are 
universals, not particulars. (And I just want to note from the outset that I shall be 
using that term “universal” in the narrow philosophical sense, referring to a 
metaphysical category, not a linguistic or cultural one. At the same time, this is not 
an argument that the concept of “document” is a universal in the philosophical 
sense. Rather, it is an argument that Moby-Dick, and every one of the trillions of 
documents that are produced daily, is each itself a universal.) 
Thirdly, I shall switch from consideration of Lowe’s work in ontology to 
look at that of philosopher Barry Smith, who has written specifically about the 
ontology of documents. At first it might seem as if Smith is working with a 
narrower definition of “document” than we are used to in library and information 
science (LIS), but I argue that ultimately we may have much to learn by taking 
Smith’s approach, one takeaway being that what Smith calls document acts are 
analogous to speech acts and should be viewed as events or occurrents as opposed 
to objects or continuants, but another, more importantly, being that all documents, 
not just the ones that are involved in the kinds of acts that Smith identifies as 
declarations, are creative in the special sense that they are generative of quasi-
abstract entities of the kind that collectively comprise social reality. 
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The goal of all of this though is not to draw definite conclusions, but to 
contribute to a solidification of connections between LIS and literatures that might 
not previously have loomed large on our collective radar, and to spark 
conversations about this material, so I shall be more than happy if I manage to do 
that, and I hope that you shall be somewhat satisfied too. 
 
I Definitions of “document” 
The initial touchstone when it comes to any discussion of definitions of “document” 
is Michael Buckland’s seminal and highly-cited 1997 paper (Buckland, 1997). This 
will be so familiar to everyone, more than twenty years later, that I hesitate to give 
more than the most cursory review, but I do think it is worth reminding ourselves 
what Buckland’s goal was with this article and what he consequently chose to leave 
out. 
Buckland explicitly poses the question “What is a document?” in the context 
of a historical discussion of the limits of documentation, as that activity was 
pursued and developed in the first half of the twentieth century. He asserts (p. 804) 
that such discussion is still “relevant to the clarification of the nature and scope of 
information systems,” given the way documentation has developed in the second 
half of the twentieth century, but (apart from brief consideration of “contemporary” 
definitions drawing from semiotics) restricts his survey of definitions of 
“document” to those emerging from the documentation movement prior to the mid-
1960s.  
So Buckland begins by considering the oeuvre of Paul Otlet (1868–1944), 
the Belgian visionary well-known to all of us, who with Henri La Fontaine founded 
the Institut international de bibliographie in 1895—which in 1931 became the 
Institut, and in 1937 the Fédération, internationale de documentation—and who 
wrote the Traité de documentation, published in 1934. For Otlet, says Buckland, 
the category of “document” includes not just graphic and written records (i.e., 
representations of ideas or of objects) but also the objects themselves—“if you are 
informed by observation of them” (Buckland, p. 805). For example: “natural 
objects, artifacts, objects bearing traces of human activity (such as archaeological 
finds), explanatory models, educational games, and works of art” (Buckland, p. 
805)— that is, objects “not intended as communication” (p. 807). Comparing 
Otlet’s ideas to some of those promoted by modern-day cultural anthropologists 
and museologists, Buckland further quotes Otlet:  
 
“Collections of objects brought together for purposes of 
preservation, science and education are essentially documentary in 
character (Museums and Cabinets, collections of models, specimens 
and samples). These collections are created from items occurring in 
nature rather than being delineated or described in words; they are 
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three dimensional documents.” (Otlet, 1920; translated in Otlet, 
1990; cited by Buckland, 1997, p. 807) 
 
Year Author Definition 
1935 Schürmeyer (trans. 
Buckland, 1997) 
“any material basis for extending our knowledge which is 
available for study or comparison” 
1937 Institut 
international de 
coopération 
intellectuelle / 
Union française 
des organismes de 
documentation 
“Any source of information, in material form, capable of being 
used for reference or study or as an authority. Examples: 
manuscripts, printed matter, illustrations, diagrams, museum 
specimens, etc.” 
1942 Donker Duyvis 
(trans. Voorhoeve, 
1964) 
“the repository of an expressed thought” 
1951 Briet (trans. 
Buckland, 1997) 
“evidence in support of a fact”; i.e., “any physical or symbolic 
sign, preserved or recorded, intended to represent, to reconstruct, 
or to demonstrate a physical or conceptual phenomenon” 
 
Table 1. Some pre-1966 definitions of “document” cited by Buckland (1997). 
 
Some further definitions of “document” cited by Buckland, all except the 
last focusing on the supposed materiality of documents, are listed in Table 1 
(emphases added). The last is from Suzanne Briet (1894–1989)—the French 
librarian who co-founded the Union française des organismes de documentation in 
1931 and published Qu’est-ce que la documentation? in 1951, and who is 
celebrated in library schools around the world for her recognition that a photo of a 
star, a stone in a museum, an antelope in a zoo—all have “become physical 
evidence being used by those who study” them (Buckland, 1997, p. 806) and 
therefore can be considered to be documents. 
Especially since the publication of Ron Day’s masterful translation and analysis 
of Qu’est-ce que la documentation? (Briet, 2006), much has been written about 
Briet’s supposedly structuralist and proto-semiotic approach to the definition of 
“document.” Buckland infers from Briet four “rules for determining when an object 
has become a document” (p. 806): 
 
1. the object must be material (this despite the translation of Briet: “any 
physical or symbolic sign ...,” emphasis added); 
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2. it must have been someone’s intention that the object is to be treated as 
evidence; 
3. the object must have been processed in some way; and 
4. the object must be perceived as a document. 
 
Buckland then cites Day as specifying that it is “indexicality—the quality of 
having been placed in an organized, meaningful relationship with other evidence—
that gives an object its documentary status” (Buckland, 1997, p. 806). 
In contrast to the emphasis on the materiality of documents that pervades his 
prior discussion, Buckland’s conclusions include (p. 808) the identification of an 
“evolving” notion of “document” that has “increasingly emphasized whatever 
function[s] as a document rather than traditional physical forms of documents.” 
Buckland sees (p. 804) a move from a traditional concern with “text and text-like 
records (e.g., names, numbers, and alphanumeric codes)” to “any phenomena that 
someone may wish to observe: Events, processes, images, and objects as well as 
texts,” and remarks (p. 808) that “The shift to digital technology would seem to 
make this distinction even more important.” 
Buckland never intended to provide comprehensive coverage, even of the time 
period to which he limited himself. A few of the definitions that did not make it 
into his survey, including one from Ranganathan, are listed in Table 2 (emphases 
added). (Buckland did cite the famous Indian librarian, but the work he chose was 
from a slightly later date than that of the one given here.) 
 
Year Author Definition 
1907 Institut 
international de 
bibliographie 
(trans. 
Weitenkampf, 
1908) 
“anything which represents or expresses, by the aid of any signs 
whatever (writing, image, diagram, symbols), an object, a fact or 
an impression” 
1943 American Library 
Association / 
Thompson 
“Any written, printed, or otherwise recorded item or physical 
object that may serve as evidence of a transaction.” 
1956 Ranganathan “Record—made on more less flat surface or on surface admitting 
of being spread flat when required, made of paper or other 
material, fit for easy handling, transport across space and 
preservation through time—of thought created by mind and 
expressed in language or symbols or in any other mode, and/or of 
natural or social phenomena made directly by instrument without 
being passed through human mind and woven into thought 
created and expressed by it.” 
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1956 Mack & Taylor “A single piece of written or printed matter which furnishes 
evidence or information upon any subject.” 
1957 Perry & Kent “An arbitrary unit of recorded knowledge which furnishes 
information upon a subject. A graphic record or group of such 
records which are physically bound together or otherwise 
contained or attached so that it may be recognized as a single 
object. Examples of documents are books, reports, letters, films, 
photographs, and tape recordings.” 
1960 Wagner “Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or 
characteristics, and includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
(1) all written material, whether handwritten, printed, or typed; 
(2) all painted, drawn or engraved material; (3) all sound or voice 
recordings; (4) all printed photographs and exposed or printed 
film, still and motion picture; and (5) all reproductions of the 
foregoing, by whatever process reproduced.” 
 
Table 2. Some further pre-1966 definitions of “document” not cited by Buckland (1997). 
 
Over the last century, various suppliers of definitions of “document” have 
chosen to emphasize the supposed physical, material, or concrete nature of 
documents. The first of Buckland’s (1997, p. 806) four “rules for determining when 
an object has become a document,” inferred from analysis of Briet’s (1951) 
discussion, points to materiality as a necessary condition. (Buckland’s translation 
of Briet’s definition—which begins “any physical or symbolic sign ...” (emphasis 
added)— might seem to contradict this inference, but other authorities cited by 
Buckland certainly lie in the explicitly materialist camp; see Table 1.) We might 
call definitions of this kind definitions of document-as-medium, since the idea they 
promote is of documents as media, vehicles, or channels, for the storage and/or 
carrying of messages. 
At the same time, other definitions (including Briet’s) have been 
constructed so as to emphasize a different kind of essence—not documents’ 
materiality, but instead their informative, evidentiary, or signifying quality. We 
might call definitions of this kind definitions of document-as-message, since they 
represent documents as aggregations of signs (i.e., messages or texts), for the 
expression and/or transmission of meanings. 
Thirdly, yet other definitions focus neither on documents’ materiality nor 
on their signhood—i.e., not on documents as bearers of meaning, physical or 
otherwise—but on their status as meanings in themselves. These are definitions of 
document-as-meaning.  
Compound definitions are those that simultaneously assign to documents 
two or three of the essential qualities of materiality, signhood, and meaninghood 
(where those latter terms stand for “being a sign” and “being meaning,” 
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respectively). For example, Wersig & Neveling (1976) define “document” as “A 
unit consisting of a data medium, the data recorded on it, and the meaning assigned 
to the data.” 
In Table 3 (emphases added), the highlights are presented, in chronological 
order, from a list of more than twenty-five definitions extracted from glossaries, 
dictionaries, standards, and other literature dating from 1966 through 2019.  
 
Year Author Definition 
1970 NATO Advisory 
Group for 
Aerospace 
Research and 
Development / 
Stolk 
“a record of data, or a concept, in any form from which 
information can be derived, e.g. a page containing data, a graphic 
representation, a tape recording, or a book” 
1971; 
1977 
Harrod [3rd & 4th 
eds.] 
“A work recorded in language or symbols, or by other means.” 
1974 Society of 
American 
Archivists / Evans 
et al. 
“Recorded information regardless of medium or 
characteristics.” 
1976 BS 5408 “A combination of a medium and the information recorded on 
or in it, which can be used for consultation, study or evidence.” 
1976 Buchanan “Generic term for the information-bearing media handled by 
librarians -- books, serials, sound recordings, films, illustrations 
etc.” 
1976 Unesco / Wersig & 
Neveling 
“A unit consisting of a data medium, the data recorded on it and 
the meaning assigned to the data.” 
1983 ISO 5127-1 “recorded information which can be treated as a unit in a 
documentation process” 
1983; 
2013 
American Library 
Association / 
Young [2nd ed.]; 
Levine-Clark & 
Carter [“4th” ed.] 
“A physical entity of any substance on which is recorded all or 
part of a work or multiple works. Documents include books and 
booklike materials, printed sheets, graphics, manuscripts, sound 
recordings, video recordings, motion pictures, and machine-
readable data files.” 
1984; 
1988 
International 
Council on 
Archives / Walne 
[1st & 2nd eds.] 
“A combination of a medium and the information recorded on 
or in it, which may be used as evidence or for consultation.” 
1987; Harrod [6th–10th “A record which conveys information; originally an inscribed or 
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1990; 
1995; 
2000; 
2005 
eds.] written record, but now considered to include any form of 
information -- graphic, acoustic, alphanumeric, etc. (e.g. maps, 
manuscripts, tape, videotapes, computer software).” 
2000 Wellisch “A medium on or in which a message is encoded; thus, the 
combination of medium and message. The term applies not only 
to objects written or printed on paper or on microforms (for 
example, books, periodicals, maps, diagrams, tables, and 
illustrations) but also to non-print media (for example, artistic 
works, audio and video recordings, films, machine-readable 
records, and multimedia) and, by extension, to naturally occurring 
or humanly made objects intended to convey information (for 
example, zoo animals, plants in botanical gardens, museum 
collections of hand tools, etc.).” 
2001 ISO 5127 “recorded information or material object which can be treated as 
a unit in a documentation process” 
2003 Feather & Sturges 
[2nd ed.] 
“A record that contains information content. In common usage it 
still normally means a piece of paper with words or graphics on 
it. In library and information work, the term is however used to 
mean any information-carrying medium, regardless of format. 
Thus books, manuscripts, videotapes and computer files and 
databases are all regarded as documents.” 
2004 Reitz “A generic term for a physical entity consisting of any substance 
on which is recorded all or a portion of one or more works for the 
purpose of conveying or preserving knowledge. In the words of 
the communication theorist Marshall McLuhan, a document is the 
‘medium’ in which a ‘message’ (information) is communicated. 
Document formats include manuscripts, print publications 
(books, pamphlets, periodicals, reports, maps, prints, etc.), 
microforms, nonprint media, electronic resources, etc. ... Also, 
any form printed on paper, once it has been filled in, especially 
one that has legal significance or is supplied by a government 
agency, for example, an application for copyright protection. ...” 
 
Table 3. Some post-1966 definitions of “document.” 
 
No particular synchronic trend is apparent in this data, but what is apparent 
is (a) the wide variety of definitions, and of combinations of category memberships, 
and (b) the fact that such combinations—that is, compound definitions—are more 
common than single ones. I take this data as evidence for concluding that 
documents are (or, at least, are typically considered to be) complex objects rather 
than simple ones. 
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The three-part compound definition corresponds partially to the four-entity 
data model that lies at the heart of IFLA’s Functional Requirements for 
Bibliographic Records (FRBR; 1998). This model distinguishes between works, 
expressions of those works, manifestations of those expressions, and items (i.e., 
copies of those manifestations). Items are the only physical entities recognized in 
this model; each item can be viewed as the medium for (or carrier of) a given 
expression or aggregation of expressions, which in turn can be viewed as the 
message(s) representing a given work or aggregation of works (see Figure 1). On 
the face of it, at least two separate conceptions of “document” can be derived from 
the WEMI (works, expressions, manifestations, items) model: one that treats 
documents simply as items, i.e., as physical media; and a second that conceives of 
documents as complex entities that exist simultaneously as material, signifying, and 
meaningful things, i.e., as messages (expressions) and meanings (works) as well as 
as media (items).   
 
 
 
Figure 1. FRBR Group 1 entities and primary relationships (1998). 
 
As a possible way of deciding between these two alternatives, we might 
consider that, in the course of a discussion of the scope of FRBR (p. 8 of the final 
report, 1998, emphases in original), the word “document(s)” is used eight times as 
a synonym for “information resource”: 
 
“... [U]sers may make use of bibliographic records for a variety of 
purposes ...: to determine what information resources exist ...; to 
verify the existence and/or availability of a particular document ...; 
to identify a source ... from which a document can be obtained ...; 
to select a document or group of documents that will serve the 
information needs of the user; .... 
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“... [T]he functional requirements for bibliographic records are 
defined in relation to the following generic tasks that are performed 
by users when ... making use of ... library catalogues: 
 
● using the data to find materials that correspond to the user’s 
stated search criteria (e.g., in the context of a search for all 
documents on a given subject ...); 
● using the data retrieved to identify an entity (e.g., to confirm 
that the document described in a record corresponds to the 
document sought by the user ...); 
● using the data to select an entity that is appropriate to the 
user’s needs ...; 
● using the data in order to acquire or obtain access to the 
entity described (e.g., ... to access online an electronic 
document ...).” 
 
Even though “document” is not subsequently used in the rest of the final 
FRBR report, the clear implication is that, in the FRBR world-view, documents are 
the sorts of things that are sought, found, selected, and acquired, as a result of 
judgments made by catalog users as to the relevance of those things, given users’ 
needs and wants. Such judgments are made on the basis of assessments of 
documents’ formats and contents—i.e., on the basis of evaluation of the qualities 
of documents as media, as messages, and as (aggregations of) meanings. On this 
reading, documents are not to be conceived primarily as physical items that have 
the properties of instantiating given manifestations, given expressions, and given 
works; rather, any given document is, simultaneously, a medium, a message, and a 
meaning.  
 
II Lowe’s category theory 
So much for an empirical survey of the various kinds of definitions of “document” 
that have been suggested over the years. The results raise a question which demands 
an ontological approach: in other words, it requires some input from the 
philosophical subfield of ontology, the study of the nature of being.  
One of the tasks of ontology that has been deemed more or less important 
since at least the time of Aristotle is the identification of the “highest,” “topmost,” 
or most general categories or kinds of things that exist in the world. Some 
ontologists have established systems of top-level categories that are hierarchical in 
structure, with one category containing all things at the very top, divided into a 
small number of sub-categories, each of which is subdivided into a small number 
of sub-sub-categories, and so on. Typically in such structures, the sub-categories at 
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any given level are both exhaustive and exclusive, so that any individual thing is a 
member of one and only one sub-category at that level. Figure 2, for example, 
depicts the top-level structure proposed by the American philosopher Roderick 
Chisholm (1916–99) in his A Realistic Theory of Categories from 1996. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Chisholm’s top-level ontology (1996). 
 
One of the most well-known contemporary top-level ontologies is that 
devised by the British philosopher Jonathan Lowe (1950–2014), who wrote as E. J. 
Lowe and who was Professor of Philosophy for many years at Durham University 
in England. Lowe’s system, which he promoted as a means of understanding the 
foundations of natural science, rests on three basic binary distinctions. Lowe 
distinguishes between universals and particulars, between substances and 
properties, and between abstracta and concreta, in arriving at the structure depicted 
in Figure 3. (The base diagram as presented here is lifted straight from one of 
Lowe’s earlier publications. He would subsequently make some changes in his use 
of terminology, and a few slight amendments to the base diagram are made in 
Figure 3: “Properties” is merged with “Relations” to form a category of 
“Attributes”; the place of “Relations” is taken by “Kinds”; and “Tropes” is replaced 
by “Modes.”) 
Questions about whether or not these distinctions may be sustained, and if 
they can, how that may be done, have been among the most hotly debated in 
metaphysics for more than two thousand years and it is certainly not my goal to 
attempt to survey answers to those questions today. What I am going to do instead 
is very briefly to characterize the distinctions that Lowe makes. 
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Figure 3. Lowe’s top-level ontology (2003), amended. 
 
Firstly, universals vs. particulars. “Even in this matter,” Lowe says (2003, 
p. 8), “there is controversy.” Lowe conceives of universals as things that are 
repeatable, that is, as things that may be “borne” or possessed by many different 
particulars, at different times and places; whereas particulars are each “wholly 
confined to a unique space-time location and cannot ‘recur’ elsewhere and 
elsewhen” (p. 8). In other words, universals are instantiable (by particulars), and 
particulars are not. Examples of universals include properties such as the property 
of being red, and kinds such as the kind denoted by the word “apple.” Examples of 
particulars include the apple I ate yesterday and the redness of that apple. 
Lowe’s distinction between substances and properties is among particulars. 
It is the distinction between objects and modes (or tropes). An object is “an entity 
which bears properties but which is not itself borne by anything else” (p. 8), like 
the apple I ate yesterday; a mode or trope is a particular that is borne as a property 
by no more than one object (p. 9), like the redness of that apple.  
We might say objects “instantiate” kinds, “exemplify” attributes, and are 
“characterized” by modes. Similarly, attributes “characterize” kinds, and are 
“instantiated” by modes (see Figure 4). Another way to think of attributes is as 
property-kinds, in parallel with the substance-kinds that are instantiated by objects. 
Objects are substance-instances, characterized by modes as property-instances. It 
has sometimes been suggested that the so-called “four-category ontology” (Lowe, 
2006) depicted in the so-called “ontological square” was first proposed by Aristotle, 
and on this basis Lowe and others in his camp are known as proponents of neo-
Aristotelian metaphysics. (The version of the ontological square presented in 
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Figure 5, by the way, was lifted from a 1997 article by Barry Smith, about whom 
we shall hear more in Part III.) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Lowe’s ontological square (2003). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Smith’s ontological square (1997). 
 
The third basic distinction that Lowe draws in his top-level hierarchy is 
among objects (that is, among substance-instances), and it is between abstract 
objects and concrete objects. Concrete objects are those that exist in space-time 
(that is, are “datable and locatable”) or at least exist in time, whereas abstract 
objects are those that do not. Examples of concrete objects include individual 
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apples; examples of abstract objects (according to Lowe) include numbers, sets, 
and propositions. A different criterion that may not coincide exactly in its picking 
out of abstract objects is the capability of an object to enter into causal relations: an 
abstract object is one that is incapable of such interaction.   
Controversy abounds in relation to the category of abstract object. For 
example, Lowe identifies propositions as a canonical sub-category of abstract 
object. But in what sense are propositions conceivable as particulars (that is, non-
instantiable) rather than as universals instantiated by sentences (expressions of 
propositions) and in turn by utterances of those sentences in physical (spoken or 
written) form? Similarly, in what sense are works—often conceived as 
aggregations of propositions—comprehensible if not as universals instantiated by 
copies of those works in physical form? 
Another bone of possible contention has to do with the category of concrete 
object. Two sub-categories of concrete object highlighted by Lowe (2003, p. 5) are 
masses, or material bodies, and living organisms:  
 
“Entities belonging to these two categories have quite different 
existence- and identity-conditions, because a living organism, being 
the kind of thing that is by its very nature capable of undergoing 
growth and metabolic processes, can survive a change of its 
constituent matter in a way that a mere mass of matter cannot. A 
mere mass, being nothing but an aggregate of material particles, 
cannot survive the loss or exchange of any of those particles, any 
more than a set can undergo a change of its members. As a 
consequence, it is impossible to identify a living organism with the 
mass of matter which constitutes it at any given stage of its 
existence, for it is constituted by different masses at different 
stages.” 
 
Lowe does not clearly establish what other sub-categories of concrete object 
there are. The category of artifacts is one obvious candidate, but Lowe has little to 
say about artifacts in general or sub-categories of artifact more specifically, which 
means we are forced to speculate a little about where in his scheme certain entities 
might fit. In a 2014 paper entitled “How real are artefacts and artefact kinds?” Lowe 
distinguishes between utensils and machines as sub-categories of artifacts, arguing 
that machines and machine kinds, like natural kinds, are fully and mind-
independently real, whereas utensils and utensil kinds—things like “tables, chairs, 
tents, cooking pots, knives, and hammers” (Lowe, 2014, p. 24)—are not. In the 
conclusion to this paper, he says “I should stress that I am not urging that machines 
are the only real artefacts. I am content to allow, for instance, that works of art may 
well qualify as real artefacts too” (p. 26, emphasis in original). At the beginning of 
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the paper, however, he had already stipulated that he was “setting aside here 
putative examples of abstract artefacts, such as musical scores, conceived as types 
rather than tokens” (p. 18, emphasis in original), thus leaving tantalizingly open the 
question as to whether works of art should be counted as particulars at all.  
The important question for the would-be ontologist of documents, then, is 
the question of where in such a system of categories documents fit. Are documents 
universals or particulars? substances or properties? and so on? It’s a question that’s 
not as easily answered as it might at first seem. We might have an inkling of the 
difficulties now that we’ve conducted our survey of definitions of “document,” and 
especially now that we’ve distinguished between the ideas of document-as-
medium, document-as-message, and document-as-meaning. 
In particular, if we cleave to a compound definition, we might expect to 
have to do some extra work in situating documents among what are typically 
conceived as exclusive categories. And if it turns out that the concept of 
“document” is too “complex” for easy placement in a top-level ontology, so be it; 
the ontology must be revised to accommodate our concept of the thing, not vice 
versa.  
One way to proceed is to start at the top of Lowe’s hierarchy, and attempt 
to justify our choice of placement of “document” on successive branches. 
Beginning at Level 0, as it were, the first question is, Are documents things or not? 
The answer is, Yes. Since the intention is that all things fall in the top category of 
“things,” documents should be treated as things. So far, so good. 
At the next level down, Level 1, the question is, Are documents universals 
or particulars? Almost immediately, we run into a problem. On the one hand, if we 
consider the document-as-medium option, it seems to be fairly clear that documents 
are particulars (that is, they are non-instantiable). On the other hand, if we take any 
of the other views (simple or compound) on the nature of documents as suggested 
by the survey, we implicitly commit to a conception of documents as instantiable, 
just as (some, but not necessarily Lowe, would argue) works and propositions are.  
Let’s continue, for the time being, on the assumption that the document-as-
medium option is the more attractive. In that case, documents are particulars. At 
the next level down, then, Level 2, the question becomes, Are documents objects 
(substance-instances) or modes/tropes (property-instances)? The simple answer is 
that, since documents are the bearers of properties, and are not borne by anything 
else, they are clearly objects, not modes. Next! 
At the next level down, Level 3, the question is, Are documents abstract or 
concrete? Even for the document-as-medium conception, there is uncertainty here 
created by the absence of artifacts among the sub-categories of Lowe’s concrete 
object. But this is probably a limitation of the presentation of Lowe’s hierarchy and 
a reason to revise that presentation rather than a reason to place documents-as-
media in any category other than concrete object. So far, so simple. 
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If we make a retreat from our choice of document-as-medium, and consider 
how to handle documents-as-messages and documents-as-meanings, as well as 
documents-as-combinations, we need to go back to Level 1, and ask again, Are 
documents universals or particulars? In these cases, the conception is of documents 
as instantiable—that is, documents as texts or works that exist as types rather than 
as tokens. In the absence of a motivation to apply any theory that differentiates 
between the type/token distinction and the universal/particular distinction, our 
decision should be to consider documents as universals. 
Moving down to Level 2, the question becomes, Are documents substance-
kinds or property-kinds (attributes)? Since documents are characterizable, the 
simple answer is substance-kinds. 
So we have a situation where on the one hand, documents “live” in a new 
sub-category of concrete objects, possibly called artifacts, where the challenge will 
be to identify the qualities that distinguish documentary artifacts from non-
documentary artifacts (if there are such things as the latter); and on the other hand, 
“document” is placed in the category of “Kinds.” There is actually a third 
possibility not suggested by our navigation through Lowe’s hierarchy, but which is 
nevertheless suggested by Lowe’s characterization of the category of abstract 
objects as including not just the sub-categories of numbers and sets, but also 
propositions. If works are considered to be aggregations of propositions, then it 
might seem that works should also be placed here; from work, it’s a short step to 
document-as-meaning, and thus to thinking of documents as abstract objects. 
Ideally we would use different words to refer to these different concepts. 
But we do not. We use a single word, “document,” interchangeably in different 
contexts to mean different things. Perhaps this is no bad thing. It keeps us on our 
toes. But I want to suggest that much of the time, many people use the word 
“document” to mean something that is a universal, not a particular—something 
that’s not necessarily material. And I think that that is important for our 
understanding of documents, and for our ideas as to where document theory could 
or even should be going.  
In essence, my argument is an empirical one about the use of language. 
What do we talk about when we talk about documents? Much of the time, the 
properties of documents that we are most interested in are properties of documents-
as-meaning, or if you like, documents-as-works, documents-as-universals, 
documents-as-types that are multiply instantiated by physical tokens. Of course, it 
is important to recognize the existence of, and to understand the nature of, the 
type/token relationship, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the sole or even the 
primary focus of document theory should be on the materiality of document tokens. 
Instead, or at least in addition, understanding the universality of document types 
should be high on our agenda. 
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We have reached the end of Part II. In the third and final part of the talk, I 
should like briefly to discuss what I take to be the most substantive contribution to 
the ontology of documents of the last few years. 
 
III Smith’s ontology of documents 
The philosopher Barry Smith published a short conference paper called “The 
ontology of documents” in 2011, following up on a presentation on a similar topic 
from 2005. In these and several related papers on his so-called “theory of document 
acts,” Smith has developed an account of the status of documents in the context of 
the picture of social reality painted by fellow philosopher John Searle over a period 
of several decades (see, e.g., Searle, 2010). 
This work is not really about categories per se, but is ontological in the sense 
that it explains how documents—or more precisely document acts like signing a 
document, filling it in, delivering it, or archiving it (see Figure 6)—have the effect 
of bringing new entities into existence, that is, how document acts have ontological 
consequences.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Smith’s list of document acts (2005), amended. 
 
Smith builds on John Searle’s ideas about speech acts—the things we do 
with words. Searle explains how certain kinds of speech acts—the ones he calls 
“declarations”—can bring about changes in the ontology of social reality, and 
Smith similarly describes how certain kinds of document acts—generally speaking, 
the things we do with rather than to documents—bring into existence not just 
physical entities like document tokens, and document-related artifacts like filing 
systems, but also document-related social practices and quasi-abstract entities (“at 
one and the same time subject to historical changes yet not made of physical parts,” 
Smith, 2011, p. 2, emphasis in original), especially in the realms of commerce, law, 
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and government. These quasi-abstract entities are things like organizations, 
contracts, laws, money, rights, obligations, identities, claims, privileges, 
corporations, capital, permissions, debts, trusts ... that is, they are entities that form 
vitally important parts of social reality. 
Smith argues that we need to pay more attention to document acts than 
Searle does. His primary reason for doing so is to address issues relating to the 
“anchorage” of digital documents to the people who created them, by implementing 
systems for the certification of authenticity that are on a par with signatures and 
fingerprinting for physical documents. 
But in the course of setting this up, Smith also makes important 
contributions to our understanding of the basic ontological categories to which 
documents belong. 
Firstly, Smith points out (as others have done before and since) how Searle’s 
categorization of speech acts may be applied to documents. Thus we may 
distinguish among documents that are representative, directive, commissive, 
expressive, and declarative. Representatives “commit the [writer] ... to the truth of 
... expressed proposition[s]”; directives “attempt ... to get the [reader] to do 
something”; commissives “commit the [writer] ... to some future course of action”; 
expressives “express the [writer’s] psychological state ... about a state of affairs”; 
and declarations “bring about correspondence between ... propositional content and 
reality” (Searle, 1975, pp. 354–361). 
Smith is most concerned with declarations, those which are most clearly 
generative of new entities. Smith uses the term “creative” rather than generative, 
with the somewhat counter-intuitive result that he classes books (fiction and non-
fiction), journal articles, maps, artworks as “non-creative”; on the other hand, 
certificates, contracts, receipts, banknotes, licenses, agreements, filled-in forms, 
passports, diplomas, medical records, meeting minutes, etc.—all have “creative 
power” in social reality (see Figure 7). 
 
17
Furner: The Ontology of Documents, Revisited
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
 
 
 
Figure 7. Smith’s list of examples of common (“creative”) documents (2005). 
 
Secondly, Smith follows Goodman in distinguishing those documents that 
are autographic, and those that are allographic. For Goodman (in Languages of 
Art), a work of art is autographic “if and only if the distinction between original 
and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact 
duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine” (Goodman, 1976, p. 113). 
Painting, sculpture, and architecture are autographic; music, photography, and 
literature are allographic.  
The autographic/allographic distinction seems to correspond at least 
roughly to the distinction between documents that exist as both types and tokens, 
and those that do not tokenize a type (see Figure 8). Briet’s photograph of a star? 
Allographic. The stone in a museum, and the antelope in a zoo? Autographic. Many 
of the “creative” document-types listed above? Autographic. Whether the 
type/token distinction itself corresponds to the universal/particular distinction is a 
complex matter that might be better left for another day, although clearly any 
conclusions will be significant for our decision-making when it comes to situating 
documents in a top-level hierarchy of categories like Lowe’s. 
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Figure 8. Smith’s application of Goodman’s autographic/allographic distinction (2005). 
 
Thirdly, and perhaps also significantly for that decision-making, Smith 
seems to conceive of document acts, including document production acts, like 
Searle’s speech acts, as events or occurrents, notwithstanding that the physical 
records that are among the products of such acts are definitively classed by Smith 
as continuants (eliding the type/token distinction). Might there be scope here for 
further sub-categorization of concrete objects? 
A more general question raised by Smith’s analysis is, What might be the 
more productive route for DOCAM-style document theory to follow? On the one 
hand, we might imagine a future document theory that commits wholeheartedly to 
the distinction drawn by Smith between creative and non-creative documents, 
carving out a subfield that focuses on the former and on kinds of issues identified 
by Smith as critical for a digital social reality whose effective and efficient 
organization depends so much on reliable authentication of autographic creative 
documents. In this way we may contribute to the kind of “scientific understanding” 
that Smith says is necessary for arriving at an “intelligent appreciation of the 
changes in social reality that are being effected through the trillions of documents 
being created daily in the digital realm” (Smith, 2014, p. 30). 
On the other hand, might it be productive to extend the notion of declarative 
documents’ creative or generative power so that all documents, including those that 
Smith identifies as non-creative but that are traditionally the main concern of 
document theory, are considered to be creative in some respect and/or to some 
degree. Smith enumerates some of the kinds of things one can do to a document, 
such as sign it, fill it in, register it, and archive it. It is surely a short step to take to 
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consider that some other such document acts include finding it, identifying it, 
selecting it, and obtaining access to it (just to choose those suggested by the FRBR 
final report), as well as organizing it, classifying it, and indexing it, and reading it, 
interpreting it, citing it, and using it, in many and various ways. Similarly, the 
products of such acts include quasi-abstract entities of many and varied kinds, 
including metadata, bibliographies, catalogs, result-sets, recommendations, 
rankings, metrics, and networks, to name just a few. 
And there I shall stop, with a reminder of my three conclusions, a list of 
sources of definitions, and a list of references. I should like to thank my colleagues 
Greg Leazer and Julie Park for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
talk, and to thank you very much for listening.  
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Sources of definitions 
Briet, S. (1951). Qu’est-ce que la documentation? Paris: Éditions Documentaires Industrielles et 
Techniques. 
BS 5408:1976. Glossary of documentation terms. London: British Standards Institution, 1976. 
Buchanan, B. (1976). A glossary of indexing terms. London: Clive Bingley. 
Donker Duyvis, F. (1942). Normalisatie op het gebied der documentatie [Standardization in the 
domain of documentation]. NIDER 214. The Hague: Nederlandsch Instituut voor 
Documentatie en Registratuur. 
Evans, F. B., Harrison, D. F., & Thompson, E. A. (Comps.); Rofes, W. L. (Ed.). (1974). A basic 
glossary for archivists, manuscript curators, and records managers. American Archivist, 
37(3), 415–433. 
Evans, F. B., Himly, F.-J., & Walne, P. (Comps.) (1984). Dictionary of archival terminology. ICA 
Handbooks 3. München: K. G. Saur. 
Feather, J., & Sturges, P. (Eds.). (2003). International encyclopedia of information and library 
science (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. 
Harrod, L. M. (1971). The librarians’ glossary of terms used in librarianship and the book crafts 
and reference book (3rd ed.). London: Andre Deutsch. 
Harrod, L. M. (1977). The librarians’ glossary of terms used in librarianship, documentation and 
the book crafts and reference book (4th ed.). London: Andre Deutsch. 
Institut international de coopération intellectuelle / Union française des organismes de 
documentation. (1937). Projet d’une terminologie de la documentation. Coopération 
Intellectuelle, 77, 234–240. 
ISO 5127-1:1983. Documentation and information—Vocabulary—Part 1: Basic concepts. Geneva: 
International Organization for Standardization. 
ISO 5127:2001. Information and documentation—Vocabulary. Geneva: International Organization 
for Standardization. 
Levine-Clark, M., & Carter, T. M. (Eds.). (2013). ALA glossary of library and information science 
(4th [sic] ed.). Chicago: American Library Association. 
 Mack, J. D., & Taylor, R. S. (1956). A system of documentation terminology. In J. H. Shera, A. 
Kent, & J. W. Perry (Eds.), Documentation in action (pp. 15–26). New York: Reinhold. 
Perry, J. W., & Kent, A. (1957). Glossary. In Documentation and information retrieval: An 
introduction to basic principles and cost analysis (pp. 136–150). Cleveland, OH: Western 
Reserve University Press.  
Prytherch, R. (Comp.). (1987). Harrod’s librarians’ glossary of terms used in librarianship, 
documentation and the book crafts and reference book (6th ed.). Aldershot: Gower. 
Prytherch, R. (Comp.). (1990). Harrod’s librarians’ glossary of terms used in librarianship, 
documentation and the book crafts and reference book (7th ed.). Aldershot: Gower. 
Prytherch, R. (Comp.). (1995). Harrod’s librarians’ glossary: 9,000 terms used in information 
management, library science, publishing, the book trades, and archive management (8th 
ed.). Aldershot, England: Gower. 
Prytherch, R. (Comp.). (2000). Harrod’s librarians’ glossary and reference book: A directory of 
over 9,600 terms, organizations, projects, and acronyms in the areas of information 
management, library science, publishing, and archive management (9th ed.). Aldershot, 
England: Gower. 
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Prytherch, R. (Comp.). (2005). Harrod’s librarians’ glossary and reference book: A directory of 
over 10,200 terms, organizations, projects and acronyms in the areas of information 
management, library science, publishing and archive management (10th ed.). Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate. 
Ranganathan, S. R. (1956). Documentation in many lands. 4. Document: Conventional and non-
conventional. Annals of Library Science, 3(1), 22–32. 
Reitz, J. M. (2004). Dictionary for library and information science. Westport, CT: Libraries 
Unlimited. 
Schürmeyer, W. (1935). Aufgaben und Methoden der Dokumentation. Zentralblatt für 
Bibliothekswesen, 52, 533–543.  
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Research and Development. 
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Chicago: American Library Association. 
Voorhoeve, N. A. J. (1964). F. Donker Duyvis and standardization. In F. Donker Duyvis: His life 
and work (pp. 39–50). NIDER Series 2, 45. The Hague: Nederlandsch Instituut voor 
Documentatie en Registratuur.. 
Wagner, F. S., Jr. (1960). A dictionary of documentation terms. American Documentation, 11, 102–
119. 
Walne, P. (Ed.). (1988). Dictionary of archival terminology (2nd ed.). ICA Handbooks 7. München: 
K. G. Saur. 
Weitenkampf, F. (1908). [Review of:] L’organisation systématique de la documentation et le 
développement de l’Institut internationale [sic] de bibliographie. Library Journal, 33, 403–
404. 
Wellisch, H. H. (2000). Glossary of terminology in abstracting, classification, indexing, and 
thesaurus construction (2nd ed.). Medford, NJ: Information Today. 
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